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ABSTRACT 
The study explores the growth of the Athens Stock Exchange through 
new listings and IPOs over the period 1880-1940. We examine 
institutional changes in exchange governance and listing requirements. 
On a theme that has not been addressed before, we find that simple 
listings were far more numerous than actual IPOs, while even during 
‘hot’ listing periods IPO activity was relatively limited. IPOs in Greece 
remained unregulated throughout the period and there is only sparse 
evidence on the involvement of professional investment banking 
services. IPOs over-pricing in the early decades gives way to under-
pricing in the 1920s. The growth of the Greek stock market was 
coincident with development episodes in the economy, as well as phases 
of protectionism. It has been driven by a demand for listings basically 
serving the liquidity needs of company owners. Finally, the study 
presents data on "quasi-IPOs" (i.e. capital increases shortly after listing) 
and shows that they offer a more accurate assessment of the demand 
for the financing of listing firms. 
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Financial Innovation and Growth: 
Listings and IPOs from 1880 to World War II 
in the Athens Stock Exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
The object of this paper is the study of listings and public offerings of 
securities in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from its inception in 1880 
to the outbreak of the second war in 1940. No previous comparable 
research exists for the Greek Stock Exchange. This is a first study of 
capital raising in an emerging European Exchange to be juxtaposed to 
several such studies of developed exchanges (e.g. London, Berlin, New 
York) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Stock exchanges are places of trade but their longer-term significance 
lies in their role as institutions for the funding of public and private 
ventures and thereby the growth of firms and sectors. The impetus for 
the development of exchanges in Europe since the 18th century has 
been furnished by the need to amass capital resources. Exchanges 
combine the collection of capital by security-issuers with the advantage 
of listing of securities for secondary trading. These two fundamental 
aspects of growth are not inseparable. Listing can occur with or without 
a concurrent public offering of securities. Whereas a public offering of 
securities is a direct capital-gathering exercise, listing can make an 
indirect contribution to capital growth by increasing the visibility and the 
reputation of a potential issuer. In developed liquid markets, public 
offers are a very visible activity of capital-raising. In emerging less liquid 
markets however, listings without direct public offerings may be a 
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predominant form of market development. Dealing with such an 
emerging market, the present study focuses on listings and public 
offerings as separable aspects of capital gathering. Our findings 
underpin this separation: public offerings in the Athens Exchange were 
relatively limited, even during periods when listings were in high 
demand. We offer analysis and explanation for this feature. 
The creation of the ASE was the second major financial innovation in 19th 
century Greece, after the establishment of the National Bank in the 
1840s. To place this study in international context, we note that the late 
19th century was a period of ‘emergence’ of many peripheral stock 
markets both in Europe and the rest of the world. These markets grew 
alongside well-established markets in the European centers [Batillosi and 
Matias (2012)]. Their ‘emergence’ was correlated with the rise of 
international capital flows and demand for foreign finance by new 
sovereign states [Bouvier (1977), Eichengreen (1996)]. The ASE was no 
exception to this general finding. Officially chartered over the period 
1876-78, it started operations in 1880. In 1878 the Greek state had 
regained access to foreign finance after an embargo of 45 years. The 
ASE, in which both government bonds and private stocks would trade, 
was a necessary mechanism for capital gathering and trading, and would 
prove to be one of the longest-lived institutions in modern Greece.  
Greek political and economic history has been very turbulent over the 
period 1880-1940. The country’s area and population practically 
doubled. Changes were not gradual but abrupt, mostly outcomes of 
wars that were won and wars that were lost; and there was a succession 
of periods that ranged from sovereign bankruptcy in 1893 to impressive 
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leaps in development in later periods. Over these sixty years, Greece was 
embroiled in six wars, two sovereign bankruptcies and many years of 
military antagonisms. The Exchange and its listed firms lived that history 
and evolved within a path defined by the needs and economic 
conditions of each period. But, arguably, the Exchange offered a fast-
reaction mechanism that facilitated recoveries, mobilization of resources 
and economic modernization through the recapitalization of older firms 
and the emergence of new ventures and new sectors. Recent historical 
research on financial markets has been influenced by prevalent 
institutional theories:  the view of the positive impact of ‘common law’ 
systems propounded by LaPorta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) and the view of the positive impact of capital flow liberalization 
argued by Rajan and Zingales (2003). The Greek legal system has been of 
the continental variety throughout the life of the sovereign Greek state 
but, as we will see, the stock market experienced considerable variation 
between periods of development and periods of stagnation. On the 
front of economic openness, Greece also remained an economy 
nominally open to capital flows throughout the period of this study. 
Nevertheless, the actual occurrence and direction of capital flows varied 
greatly, especially as a result of sovereign bankruptcies, domestic 
politics, wars and the collapse of international monetary systems. Thus, 
the variation between stock market development and stagnation cannot 
be prima facie attributed to large shifts in the legal system or the 
institutional arrangements for international capital flows, in the case of 
Greece. We must engage in evaluation of other forces that have 
powered this pendulum. We focus on economic conjuncture and the 
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variation of the size and character of the domestic market which evolved 
significantly over the period of this study. 
Financial theories of capital gathering establish useful propositions that 
can inform historical study. It is generally acknowledged that markets for 
external finance can only function if there is an adequate level of trust 
between investors, issuers and sponsors. In a variety of financial models, 
a specific aspect of trust is represented as informational asymmetry. As 
Myers and Majluf (1984) have argued, such asymmetry can make the 
cost of external finance so high as to be prohibitive.  In a theoretical 
context more directly applicable to initial public offerings Rock (1986) 
has argued that asymmetric information among investors leads to 
underpricing of new issues, an effect likened to a ‘winners curse’. A 
considerable strand of subsequent literature ((Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), Ljunqgvist (2007))  has upheld the notion 
that institutional, regulatory and governance arrangements can mitigate 
asymmetries and improve trust. Extensive empirical work in 
contemporary markets has verified considerable underpricing of new 
equity issues, but with much variation across time and space3.  
Taking the cue from contemporary markets, historical researchers have 
focused on the major European markets (where transactions and data 
are ample) and have examined the underpricing  phenomenon in the 
                                                 
3
 There are several studies of public offerings in the ASE but all focus on recent periods beginning with 
the 1980s
3
 (see e.g., (Kazantzis and Levis Kazantzis, C., and M. Levis, 1995. Price support and initial 
public offerings: evidence from Athens Stock Exchange, Journal in International Business and Finance 
12, 185-200.; Thomadakis, S., D. Gounopoulos, and C. Nounis, 2012. The long term performance of 
Initial Public Offerings in the Athens Stock Exchange European Financial Management 17, 117-141.; 
Thomadakis, S., D. Gounopoulos, C. Nounis, and A. Merikas, 2014. Collateral regulation and IPO 
specific rebelarization: The case or price limits in the Athens Stock Exchange, European Financial 
Management, Forthcoming.). There are also few, mostly official, histories of the Exchange which do 
not illuminate sufficiently its fundamental function of capital gathering and company finance. See 
Platanopoulos M., History of the Athens Stock Exchange, 1876-1976, Athens 1976 
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late 19th or early 20th centuries. Chambers and Dimson (2009), examining 
the track record of the London Exchange, make a remarkable 
observation: a long-term  rise in underpricing appears to have occurred 
over time, in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the 
prestige of IPO underwriters. Working on the Berlin Exchange, Fohlin 
(2010) shows that investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s 
experienced, on the contrary,  low spreads between the price they paid 
for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. 
Burhop et al. (2012) observe that during the early 20th century IPOs 
were regulated more heavily in Germany than in Britain and as a result 
the failure rate of IPOs on the Berlin Stock Exchange was lower than it 
was in London. Lehmann (2014) reports that even though German IPO 
business was in the hands of a small oligopoly, the terms of IPOs has 
been a result of the tight regulation of underwriting, which ensured the 
quality of all firms on the German market.  
A peripheral and emerging stock exchange, as the Athens Exchange was 
in the late 19th century, cannot be approached however on the same 
footing and with the same analytical agenda as developed central 
markets in Europe. Its institutional reputation had to be established and 
its liquidity (i.e. the willingness of savers to place their funds in 
Exchange-traded securities) had to be secured in an environment where 
liquidity was generally scarce and monetary values exhibited great 
fluctuation. It follows that when we examine matters such as listing 
requirements and the growth of the Exchange in terms of listings and 
primary offerings, we must be cognizant of these environmental factors 
and a more general correlation of the path of the Exchange to economic 
and political conditions. Thus, we pay a lot of attention to historical 
  
6 
circumstance and the phases followed by the Greek economy over the 
sixty years.  
Differing from studies focusing on developed markets, we have 
expanded the meaning of IPOs to capital increases occurring in the two 
years following listing. We have collected data on these capital increases 
and compare them to actual primary offerings. The view of listings as a 
first step towards the raising of external capital finds support from these 
comparisons. We also undertake analysis of IPO underpricing itself, 
within the confines of our narrow sample of actual IPOs, and find 
significant change over time.  
Besides listing requirements that held for all introductions of new 
shares, IPOs remained unregulated throughout the period and there is 
little evidence about the involvement and role of professional 
investment banking in primary security issues and their pricing. This is a 
major difference from what has been documented in developed markets 
of that period, where IPOs were regulated and investment banking was 
formalised. It does not appear that standardised arrangements of 
investment banking emerged in Greece, although some services of 
investment bankers were provided. This implies that disclosure quality 
remained uneven and low. The population of IPOs was also low. It is 
noteworthy nonetheless that even in this small population both over- 
and under-pricing made an appearance over time. We present historical 
conjectures for the timid growth of IPOs and look at possible factors to 
explain IPO pricing in line with the empirical literature.  
The early enlargement of the Greek stock market was clearly driven 
more by a demand for listings than by discreet large offers of new issues 
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for the direct enlargement of company capital. This implies that, 
contrary to what we know of developed markets, the study of listings is 
a major pillar for understanding the evolution of peripheral markets. In 
the Greek case, we document a decisive shift in the character, the size 
and sector of listings and IPOs between the first decades of ASE 
operation and the boom decade of the 1920s. This shift was related to a 
reorientation of economic activity, with emphasis on light domestic 
industry. It also correlated to stock market entries by smaller firms, a 
phenomenon that may be described as a ‘democratisation of market 
finance’. Interestingly, this democratization was evident in the 
population of listings but also implied very visible changes in pricing of 
primary offerings. We provide analysis of these changes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
background to the creation of the ASE, the evolution of its governance 
and listing requirements. Section III presents the periodization of our 
study, the historical features of each sub-period and associated the 
sample of listings and IPOs. In Section IV we present the main statistical 
features of our sample, including the discussion of quasi IPOs. In Section 
V we undertake an analysis of IPO pricing and test a regression model of 
underpricing. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
2. Exchange Foundation and Governance 
2.1 Unregulated Public Offers, Bubbles and the Genesis of an Organized 
Market 
The birth of the Athens Stock Exchange was doubtlessly conditioned by a 
dramatic precedent: a ferocious cycle of mania and panic that grew out 
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of unregulated public offers of shares in the early 1870s. The mania 
coincided with the first attempts at Greek industrialization, [Agriantoni 
(2014)], focused on mining and metalworking shares primarily, but 
encompassed banking shares as well. This was a time of speculative 
frenzy in other European exchanges. The link of the Athenian 
transactions with those of Europe was forged through the activities of 
Greek ‘diaspora’ financiers, who, during the 1870s were increasingly 
active in Athens along with the Ottoman Empire and other European 
capitals, [Syngros (2012)].   
Citizens of the independent Kingdom of Greece thus had their first 
serious brush with a speculative bubble in 1873.  The public offer that 
sparked the mania was of shares in a company running the metal 
processing plant around the mine of Lavrion, a rich silver source in 
ancient times. Rumors and reckless political rhetoric about endless 
riches led to spectacular high prices, succeeded by rapid decline in early 
1874. The buyers of shares were not only the wealthy Athenian elite. 
Small savers and shopkeepers, simple folk from all strata, lured by the 
dream of quick enrichment, were embroiled in the buying mania only to 
experience ultimate loss. Thus, the ‘investor base’ was greatly expanded 
during the mania. The ‘Lavreotika’, as the events were called, would 
remain etched in collective memory for a long time. The inauguration of 
public offers of equity shares in Greece became an occasion of loss, pain 
and social suspicion against financial tycoons. The social mistrust would 
influence proceedings at the stock exchange for at least the early years 
of its operation.  
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The drama of boom and bust of 1873-74 played out in an informal 
market which was operating in and around a popular Athenian coffee 
house. Share sales were conducted literally ‘over the counter’ in coffee 
shops, grocery stores and merchant establishments. The organization of 
new issues, the pricing of the offers, and the details of distribution were 
managed primarily by the issuers and two newly founded merchant 
banks, the Credit Bank established in 1872 and the Industrial Credit Bank 
established in early 1873. The two banks had been launched by 
competing groups of recently arrived Greek ‘diaspora’ financiers and had 
also offered shares to the public. Merchant banking was surely a 
significant innovation in the economy of Greece at the time. The prime 
mover of innovation was Andreas Syngros, a famous financier-tycoon 
who had made a fortune in the Ottoman Empire, trading commodities 
and Ottoman public bonds. As a recent entrant in Greek economic 
affairs, he had acquired earlier in 1873 the ‘Lavrion Metalworks’ after a 
bitter dispute between the Greek government and a Franco-Italian 
group who were the original owners of the Metalworks, [Syngros 
(2008)]. One of the conditions of the purchase was that he put up a 
portion of the shares for public sale. 
In the aftermath of the bust and the political outcry that ensued, the 
creation of an organized market was announced in 1876 with the 
publication of a royal decree that contained the first charter and a body 
of rudimentary rules of the Exchange. The rulebook would be revised in 
1879 and actual operation would be inaugurated in 1880. Operation has 
continued to this day, with several interruptions during wars and crises 
of course, making the Athens Stock Exchange the second longest-lived 
financial institution in the country.  
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Shortly before the official launch of the Exchange, a landmark 
development that would change the course of the Greek market for 
capital had taken place: the government of Greece, which had been 
embargoed for several decades from international markets due to 
sovereign defaults in the 1830s, regained access to international 
borrowing, [Dertilis (2008)]. This was a time in which the international 
markets for bonds were expanding, strong capital exports from the 
developed European economies were directed to the world periphery 
and the role of exchanges was prominent in the process. In that context, 
the prospect of capital inflows to Greece hastened the inauguration of 
the organized Exchange as an official trading venue for government 
paper, company equities or bonds.   
A remarkable aspect of the Exchange as a public market for securities is 
that its charter included no regulation of public offers of shares, nor was 
a public offer required for listing. The absence of such provision appears 
all the more conspicuous considering the traumatic events of 1873-74, 
when the unregulated public offer of shares had been at the centre of a 
big crisis. The continuation of the unregulated status of public offers 
testified to the power of issuers and financiers, especially at a time when 
Greece was reconnecting to the international financial market in which 
entrepreneurs belonging to the Greek Diaspora were already active. In 
our view, the memory of the crisis of the 1870s entrenched an ‘IPO 
aversion’ among the broad investing public, as an initial condition that 
would affect the evolutionary path of the Exchange. It is generally true 
that investors in stock exchanges have short memories and their 
behaviour is determined by the micro and macro-economic conditions 
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that prevail in a given market and by profit considerations, (Eichengreen 
and Linbert (1989)). 
Nevertheless, shocks and crises may shape initial conditions that affect 
later evolution. The only policy that could hope to facilitate IPO growth 
would have been quality regulation of IPOs and especially mandatory 
disclosure rules. Such regulation existed already in developed markets. 
In Greece however it would not be forthcoming for decades. This is a 
puzzling finding, considering that regulation of both listing requirements 
and transaction rules was undertaken during the period. The Exchange 
was not a government operation. It was a self-regulated entity governed 
by its members. It had basic rules of transaction and settlement as well 
as minimum listing requirements.  On its first bulletin issued on May 12, 
1880, the 17 securities listed for trading included six government bonds, 
one corporate bond and ten company equities. As we document below, 
listings were far more numerous than initial public offerings.  Most 
companies would acquire their first capital before listing by placement 
of shares among narrow groups or even a public offer. They would also 
engage in capital increases after listing. In following sections of the 
paper we will come back to a closer look at governance reforms and the 
analysis of listings and public offerings of private shares.  
The inauguration of organized exchange operation did not subjugate 
legally (or in practice) the pre-existing ‘free market’ for shares, as the 
over-the-counter market was called in 19th century Athens. The two 
coexisted and operated in parallel. Shares listed on the Exchange would 
trade in both markets, but of course many non-listed shares were also 
traded over the counter. In fact, it appears that the ‘free market’ was a 
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very lively one. In the early years, trading on the Exchange would last for 
a half to three quarters of an hour and then the ‘free market’ would 
operate with some exchange members participating. A contemporary 
newspaper reports that the more important transactions were 
conducted in the ‘free market’. In 1884 there was trading in the shares 
of 26 companies (including a few foreign ones) in the ‘free market’, more 
than twice the number of shares listed on the Exchange. Some of the 
shares traded off- market would go on to become listed, having 
presumably proved their tradability, but many never acquired that 
status. It is notable that no foreign company issues were traded on the 
Exchange.  
An early historian of the Athens exchange wrote: “this [‘free market’] 
operated in the streets around the Stock Exchange. It functioned from 
morning till night, often to midnight. It was not organized. Some dealers 
had offices others not. The trading customs followed those of the official 
exchange. Guarantees and sureties required were, as a rule, lower than 
the normal ones” [Keramidas (2013)]. The ‘free market’ was to be 
officially sidelined by the grant of monopoly status to the Exchange in 
1918, 38 whole years after its founding; however evidence of free 
market operations persists in press reports throughout the 1920s. 
2.2 Exchange Governance and its Successive Reforms 
From a governance standpoint, the Exchange remained a self-regulated 
organization until 1918, when a landmark law imposed government 
interventions, additional rules on its operation and a government-
appointed inspector who would oversee their application. Law 1308 of 
  
13 
1918 was inspired from analogous legislation of the 1890s and 1900s in 
civil law jurisdictions, mainly Germany, France and Italy; its timing was 
clearly related to the occurrence of a very large Stock Exchange bubble 
in 1918 and the rapid increase in speculation that followed the end of 
the war.  The new law brought about an overhaul both of legal status 
and operating procedures. The Exchange became a public legal entity 
and was granted a monopoly on legal transactions of shares, following 
earlier French and German arrangements. Other provisions covered the 
areas of brokers’ duties, clearing and settlement and types of 
transactions, including cash, forward, option and repo-type transactions. 
The law additionally introduced, for the first time, penal sanctions for 
misinformation, frauds and abuse of investors’ trust.  
Law 1308 converted the Exchange to a public legal entity and 
established areas of direct government intervention in Exchange affairs; 
the government retained major powers not only in oversight but also in 
decision-making, as compared to earlier arrangements. A government 
inspector’s office was installed with a duty of general supervision of the 
rules of operation, the power to suspend Exchange operation for up to 
five days and the responsibility of proposing to the Minister of Finance 
longer interruptions. An ‘Exchange Council’, separate from the 
Exchange’s governing board, was constituted; its composition included 
public servants, bank representatives and brokers, the latter being a 
minority. The Council wielded powers over policy, broker licensing, 
listing and delisting proposals (to which we return below). It was chaired 
by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Economy. The creation of the 
Council represented a severe curtailment in the power of brokers, 
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especially as it removed from their control two decisions of strategic 
importance: broker licensing and securities’ listing. 
Ten years later, a new law - Law 3632 of 1928 - was passed revising the 
governance structures, rules and operations. As was true at the time of 
the Exchange’s original founding in 1878, this was also a period of major 
change in financial architecture in Greece and in the country’s 
adherence to international monetary arrangements.  In May 1928, 
Greece established a new central bank, the Bank of Greece, which took 
over responsibility for monetary management; Greece committed to the 
gold - exchange standard at the same time, [Bank of Greece (2013)]. The 
prospect of regaining full participation in the international monetary 
system and a new opening to the international economy provided 
significant impetus for modernization of the Exchange.  
The 1928 law maintained the role of a government inspector clarifying 
his responsibilities vis-à-vis the governing board of the Exchange which 
was again a committee of broker-members. Importantly, the Exchange 
Council that had been established in 1918 now assumed powers of final 
decision in matters that had earlier required either Ministerial or Cabinet 
approval. In that sense, the new legislation ‘depoliticized’ the decision 
process and allowed speedier decision-making. In the same spirit, a 
special ‘Exchange Court’ was established which would rapidly adjudicate 
differences, claims and frauds arising from transactions both among 
brokers and between brokers and clients. The explicit justification for 
instituting a special court was the need for speedy resolution of 
disputes, which was impossible to achieve in the regular courts. The 
penal sanctions for market abuse would also come under the jurisdiction 
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of the special court, and this meant a considerable strengthening in 
speed of enforcement. The law rebalanced the earlier regime of 
governance by re-expanding Exchange autonomy in specific areas that 
had been relegated to government decision in 1918, such as licensing, 
listing and brokers’ disputes.  
Furthermore, rules for clearing and settlement were revised, the criteria 
for licensing of brokers, disciplinarian measures for members and 
brokers’ fees were clearly specified.  A brokers’ Guarantee Fund, whose 
primary form had been already established in August 1923, was now 
fully organized as a collectively financed self-insurance fund for brokers.  
Its express purpose was to cover obligations to other brokers if one of 
their members defaulted and to compensate investors if the broker - in - 
default left unfulfilled claims. The Guarantee Fund has proved to be a 
very useful and stable arrangement that survives to this day.  
The reform of 1928 sought to improve both the efficiency and the 
credibility of Exchange operation. The provisions on speedier 
enforcement of market abuse prohibitions and of the compensation 
scheme for investor losses due to broker failures formed the first 
cohesive framework for investor protection in Greece. 
Social justice is a powerful but elusive term for social policy analysis, and 
is concerned with the extent to which social arrangements may be 
regarded as fair (e.g. Alcock et al. 2002, Lister 2007) –i.e. who should get 
what, and under what terms- and implies a distributional element. Social 
policies produce vertical and/or horizontal redistribution (Culyer 1980). 
The extent to which such redistribution is justified and which form 
should be given priority, depends on the way of understanding the 
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principle of equality. It particularly reflects the potential belief that 
certain specific scarce commodities –such as healthcare or education- 
should be distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them. 
Social justice legitimizes a principle of ‘redistributive equality’ (e.g. Tobin 
1970) –a fair reallocation of income and wealth. This principle leads to a 
range of equalising policies, which modify initial distribution by the 
provision of welfare benefits. In every respect, a socially just distribution 
is primarily concerned with the provision of adequate material resources 
to live with dignity, to overcome disadvantage and to flourish. The 
principle of equality lies at the root of conflict in politics (Brittan 1968). 
Different meanings of equality reflect equally different understandings 
of social policy (e.g. Weale 1993). The ‘thick’ version of equality has been 
variously called ‘social equality’, ‘equality of status’ or ‘equality of 
regard’ (Alcock et al 2002: 77). It reflects the recognition of the 
fundamental equality of each individual in social relationships, and an 
opposition to social privilege or inequality (e.g. Tawney 1931). 
2.3 Listing Requirements 
At the beginning of its operation the Exchange instituted and followed 
two basic listing conditions for shares of private companies. The first was 
very specific:  at least one third of the company capital had to be paid 
up. This was a condition that ensured credibility for the original owners 
but also constituted a rudimentary anti-speculative device against the 
sale of empty shells on the Exchange floor. It was not required to 
conduct a public offer of shares to obtain listing. There was however a 
second condition for listing: a general provision that shares must show 
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potential for trading activity4. The determination of this potential was 
left to the governing board of the Exchange, based on evidence 
furnished by the candidate company. Besides papers certifying its legal 
status and some form of financial statements, tradability would logically 
be established on only two grounds: (a) evidence of the actual dispersion 
of ownership before listing; (b) actual trading in the lively informal 
market which was in operation at least until the 1920s. It is highly 
probable that evidence of off-market trading was acceptable in the early 
years since the ‘free market’ was legitimate until 1918, when the 
Exchange was granted the monopoly of legal transactions in shares.  
One of the far reaching innovations of Law 1308 of 1918 was the change 
in listing requirements and procedures.  As compared to the previous 
constraint of a minimum percent of paid up capital, the size of capital 
now became a prerequisite for listing. In addition, companies were 
required to have published at least two annual financial statements prior 
to the time of listing if their capital exceeded 2 million drachmas, but 
only one set of annual financial accounts if their capital exceeded 5 
million5. Thus, larger capital size was taken as a criterion of quality. With 
regard to financial statements, the law made no mention of either 
accounting standards or audits. Nevertheless, the fact itself that financial 
reporting was elevated to a legal prerequisite for listing must have 
boosted both the accounting process and the accounting profession.  
More generally, the criterion of size acted as a double edged instrument: 
it encouraged large firms, even if they were newly formed ventures, to 
seek listing.  The earlier requirement of evidence of tradability did not 
                                                 
4
 Stock Exchange Organizational Charter (1879) ,  article 12,  Platanopoulos M., ibid, p.37 
5
  Art 18, Law 1308/1918, Papadimos A., ibid, p. 74 
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reappear in Law 1308 of 1918. It would be inconsistent for a law that 
instituted a legal monopoly of Exchange transactions to require evidence 
that implicitly admitted the function of the informal market.  
The law of 1918 took the power of listing (and delisting) decisions away 
from the governing board of the Exchange, i.e. the brokers. The 
Exchange Council (constituted as described in the previous section) 
assumed the responsibility to evaluate applications for listing and make 
proposals to the Minister of Economy who was the final decision-maker. 
This represented a politicization of the process of listing that would be 
severely criticized both in terms of slowness of process and for 
governmental meddling in listings6. In the long parliamentary proposal 
that the Minister had drafted to support this law, it was generally 
accepted that the direct involvement of government would assure 
normal function and the elimination of speculative excess7. This 
presumption was probably related to the serious omissions that we 
noted earlier. It was implied that government’s active involvement and 
the reduction in the power of brokers were deemed sufficient to 
reestablish market credibility, after the speculative excess of 1918.  
Ten years later, law 3632 of 1928 revised again listing requirements for 
shares. The size of capital required for listing was raised to 5 million 
drachmas and published annual financial statements over at least three 
years prior to listing; however it sufficed for companies whose capital 
exceeded 10 million to present only one year’s financial accounts. In 
addition, candidate companies had to provide information about their 
                                                 
6
 See Parliamentary introduction to the later Law 3632/1928  
7
 Parliamentary introduction to Law 1308/1918, Papadimos A., ibid 
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shareholdings and their history of capital increases prior to listing8. Thus, 
evidence of dispersion of ownership and tradability made its way back 
onto the complement of listing requirements. The increase in capital size 
did not necessarily represent a tightening of listing requirements. 
Increases in nominal drachma amounts may have simply been an 
adjustment to inflation of the decade since 1918. If we consider the gold 
parity of the drachma (see Figure 1) the change in nominal size actually 
represented a reduction in gold value terms.  
Law 3632 of 1928 rebalanced the power of decision over listings. It 
vested the Exchange Council with decision-making authority for listings 
thus distancing the arrangement from the politicization of direct 
ministerial involvement of 1918, but maintaining at the same time the 
limits on brokers’ influence. The Council became a ‘listing authority’ that 
could act speedily and with adequate expertise on admissions to trading.  
It is worth repeating that, like its predecessors, this more sophisticated 
law included no explicit regulation of public offers of shares. The 
conduct of public offers continued to be unregulated until after the 
Second World War.  
3. Exchange Listings and IPOs 1880 to 1940:  
The Impact of the Environment 
3.1 The Sample 
Using archival data from the files of the Stock Exchange and the National 
Bank of Greece, press reports and Exchange bulletins we have put 
together Table 1 (in Appendix) which shows new listings and initial 
                                                 
8
 Art. 19 of Law 3632/1928 see, Keramidas T., Stock exchanges, Athens 1929, p.36 
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public offerings of equity shares in the years 1880-1940. Figure 1 shows 
diagrammatically listings and IPOs for the entire period 1880-1940. 
The data in the Figure show two general characteristics. The first is that 
listings by far exceeded IPOs throughout the period. Over the 60 years 
(1880-1940) there are 165 new company listings and of those only 21 
companies conducted concurrent IPOs. Thus, market development was 
based on listings, primarily. The second characteristic is that there is a 
strong movement of ebb and flow over the years in the process of 
gaining access to the Exchange. There are periods of little or no listing 
activity and other periods in which new listings occurred at a rapid pace. 
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In order to separate out those periods more clearly we have constructed 
Figure 2. We show periods in which, in at least two consecutive years, 
the number of new listings exceeded the annual average of the whole 
period 1880-1940 (hot periods of listing activity). That average is 2.70 
per annum and the hot periods are 1911-12, 1916-20, 1922-29, and 
1937-40. Hot periods encompass 21 years. New listings in those years 
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represented 61 percent of all listings in the long 60-year period 
examined here.  
It is important to note that the visible jumps in listing activity did not 
follow but rather preceded the changes in listing requirements in 1918 
and 1928. This is an expected characteristic of the political process as 
decision-makers, business lobbies, the press and the public are not 
prescient about market developments but become energized after 
market activity develops sufficiently to capture attention and to exert 
visible impacts on the economy. So it is significant that legal changes 
occurred in the midst (or towards the end) of periods when listing 
activity was strong and continuous. 
Thus, it appears that the process was not driven by legal change but 
rather by demand for listings. In turn, demand for listings was linked to 
economic conditions and the state of expectations in the Greek 
environment. In fact, the economic and political environment was in 
constant turmoil.  Over the sixty years from 1880 to 1940, Greece was 
embroiled in two world wars, four local wars and two sovereign 
bankruptcies. The Exchange and its listed firms lived that history and 
responded to the needs and the conditions of each period. It is 
impossible to gain an understanding of the movement of listings and 
IPOs without a background ‘history tour’, since shifts were not random 
but, to a large extent, historically conditioned.  
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Figure 2. No of companies listed in ¨hot¨ years where the listing activity exceed 
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Before embarking on our brief ‘history tour’ however, we must ponder 
the conceptual distinction between listing with and without a public 
offering of shares, as this is a dominant characteristic of the data in 
Table 1. The question is what incentive was there to list, if immediate 
access to external equity finance was not sought simultaneously. The 
question becomes even sharper if we recall that the Exchange was not a 
monopolistic trading venue but coexisted and competed with the ‘free 
market’ for more than half the period. If listing simply meant access to 
trading liquidity for company owners, the ‘free market’ was available 
and apparently quite active. So what would a firm gain by listing (but not 
raising capital concurrently) on the Exchange?  
Two simple conjectures fit the qualitative evidence. First, the attainment 
of listing requirement was a reputational signal for the company being 
listed, since successful examination by Exchange authorities offered 
‘certification’, something that could not exist for the ‘free market’9. 
Second, companies that obtained listing could exploit their new visibility 
                                                 
9
 The certification function is normally attributed to underwriters in the modern literature. In the 
context of the Greek market no formal underwriting arrangements have been recorded. Listing and 
tradability of shares could also increase their value as collateral for borrowing from banks 
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to proceed to later capital increases by secondary offers, after 
establishing a track record on the Exchange. This implies that listings 
were not ‘stand alone’ decisions but part of a process at the end of 
which external equity capital was indeed raised10. Contemporaries also 
noted that listings at times of high inflation enabled inflation adjustment 
to company capital. Indeed, for a large portion of the period under study 
inflation was high. In any case, although listing was not 
contemporaneous to an offer of new shares, it could act as a 
precondition to one. In addition, in a historical context where early 
mistrust for IPOs was high due to the events of the 1870s, the low 
liquidity in the overall economy must have also contributed to this 
result.  
In the next several paragraphs we describe briefly the unfolding 
historical conditions and aim to connect them to the evolution of 
listings. We organize this discussion into three sub-periods which are 
historically cogent11: 1880-1898, 1899-1922 and 1923-1940. 
3.2 From development to official bankruptcy and international control: 
1880-1898 
The last twenty years of the 19th century witnessed a great cycle in 
Greek economic fortunes. In 1878 Greece had, as already said, regained 
access to international markets and a large inflow of borrowed funds 
occurred, giving a visible boost to liquidity, investment planning and 
                                                 
10
 See section E below for data on capital increases that took place soon after listing 
11
 For general historical references see G. Dertilis, History of the Modern Greek State 1830-1920 (in 
Greek), Athens 2005 and C. Costis, Les enfants gâtés de l'histoire: The formation of neo-hellenic state 
(in Greek), Athens 2013, Critical dates are 1898 (the year of Greece’s defeat in war with Turkey and 
the initiation of International Financial Control), 1922 (the year of the disastrous end to the Asia 
Minor war with Turkey), 1940 (the beginning of WW2). See below more details in the ‘history tour’ 
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general economic activity. The 1880s saw the launching of major 
infrastructural projects, railroads, roads and the Corinth Canal, leading 
to feverish activity of building and construction of public infrastructure. 
Many of these works had long incubation periods and could not help 
service loans in the short term. A worsening balance of payments, the 
increasing burden of public debt and the intensification of military 
spending produced a fiscal crisis in the late 1880s. International lending 
became much restricted after the Baring Crisis and the Argentine default 
in 1892.  Greece itself followed with sovereign default in 1893. In the 
ensuing years the drachma devalued substantially and new import tariffs 
were imposed which eventually boosted domestic production and 
exports. However, war with Turkey broke out in 1897 with disastrous 
consequences for Greece: besides the waste and demoralization of 
defeat, Greece was burdened with heavy reparation payments to 
Turkey. The country’s public finances were placed under International 
Financial Control in 189812.  
From being a confident new entrant into international markets in the 
late 1870s, Greece was reduced to the status of a fiscal mendicant 
within twenty years. The cycle of over-indebtedness of the government 
was assisted both by all too-willing lenders and domestic 
mismanagement. The growing share of military expenditures was a 
major reason for over-borrowing and was either directly unproductive 
or, even if interpreted as an ‘investment’ in territorial protection and 
expansion, was heavily damaged in the war of 1897. Practically, this 
entire cycle could also be read as a swing of the pendulum from a stance 
of international economic openness to one of protection and relative 
                                                 
12
 On the IFC see G. Dertilis, ibid 
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isolation.  In the latter phase, which set in after the sovereign default, 
protection had a positive impact on domestic production. The reflection 
of these movements is directly observable on the Stock Exchange and 
the evolution of listings in the early years of the twentieth century.  
Admissions onto listing on the Exchange were relatively numerous in the 
1880s and the 1890s with eight listings in the first and ten in the second 
decade. The composition of the companies listed varied considerably 
between the two decades. In the 1880s, it was dominated by the 
quickening pace of infrastructure investments and military production: 
of the eight companies listed, three were railroads two were 
construction firms and one was a powder and explosives company. In 
the 1890s listings were more diversified reflecting the acceleration of 
domestic production under protective tariffs and devaluation: listed 
companies were active in energy, steam-shipping, textiles, machine 
tools. Thus, we observe the first appearance of ‘industrial stocks’ on the 
Exchange. The largest company listed however a bank, the Bank of 
Athens was. Please see Appendix B for Table 1 
In this sub-period, and compared to 15 new listings, there were 5 IPOs. 
They reflected the trends of the time: a munitions manufacturer, two 
railroad companies, a bank and a company managing public land rents.  
3.3 Recovery, War and Expansion: 1899-1922 
The quarter century following Greece’s fiscal subjection to international 
financial control is one of the most dense and turbulent periods in the 
country’s economic history. Fiscal adjustment was gradually achieved 
and the drachma followed a path of revaluation in the early years of the 
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new century, reaching its pre-1893 levels in 1909. The balance of 
payments improved especially with the emergence of remittances from 
emigrants and shipping, which constituted a fresh source of domestic 
liquidity [Repoulis (2010)]. The country regained confidence and 
although traditional industries were hurt by the currency revaluation, 
new and more technologically advanced firms made their appearance, 
with several showing up in Exchange listings, as we explain below. Amid 
this climate, political change was spearheaded by an officers’ revolt, a 
new government with plans for broad modernization was instituted and 
the country’s geographic expansion started with the union of Crete with 
Greece in 1913. Crete was officially annexed to Greece in December 
1913, after the end of the Balkan Wars. It would be fair to characterize 
the first decade of the twentieth century as a period of peace and 
recovery with fiscal and monetary stability. This would soon change 
however. 
With new confidence vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire which was 
disintegrating, Greece went to war in 1912-13 and the victorious 
outcome saw a doubling of its territory to the north and a near-doubling 
of its population. Greece joined the Entente in World War I and obtained 
further territorial gains. The period of 1916-19 was, despite the war, one 
of economic optimism for the future of an enlarged nation. However, 
the war for Greece did not end in 1918.  The country became embroiled 
in war with Turkey in Asia Minor in 1920 ending in defeat for Greece in 
1922. That defeat brought another kind of expansion: almost a million 
and a half of Asia Minor Greeks were uprooted and forced to move to 
Greece as refugees. This huge and sudden ‘population shock’ was 
initially debilitating and had dire fiscal consequences since the country 
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had to cope with a huge resettlement effort. The ten years of almost 
continuous war had, as expected, forced new fiscal imbalances and 
monetary financing of budgets. The resettlement effort made things 
even worse. The period of wars was one of rapid inflation of the order of 
25-55 percent annually.  
The Stock Exchange experienced two distinct booms during this period, 
with new listings and public offerings apparently coalescing around 
these booms. The first occurred in 1904-6, a period when recovery and 
monetary stabilization had entrenched themselves; the second occurred 
in 1916-19, a period when, despite the war, optimism about the 
enlarged Greece was running high but also a time of inflation and large 
business profits. Leading sectors in the listings of these periods were 
banks, steamship companies, cement companies, the first Greek electric 
utility company, foods, chemicals and textiles. Steamship companies 
represented the most export-oriented sector of the time whereas most 
others were oriented to the internal market which, especially during the 
war and with territorial expansion was both protected and considerably 
enlarged. In the first decade of stability (1900-10) larger companies were 
founded that undertook large new investments and sought greater 
efficiency of production. In the second decade, inflation and domestic 
demand dominated the motives for company formations and listings, 
[Agriantoni (2014)]. As noted with regard to the previous period (1880-
98) conditions of trade protectionism boosted the emergence of 
enterprises that catered to the domestic market and this happened 
inevitably during the ten-year period of Greek engagement in wars.  
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One notable feature is that, in every period of quickened listing activity, 
new banks were systematically emerging, both at times of monetary 
stability and at times of inflation. One factor that must have played a 
role in this was the large increase in inflows of foreign exchange in the 
form of remittances from recent Greek emigrants and from shipping. 
These provided a source of liquidity independent of official borrowings 
and were quite dispersed in the population. Furthermore, foreign 
private investments made their appearance during the first decade of 
the twentieth century, directed especially to new banking ventures, 
(Costis (2013)). Arguably, the listing of banks was an indicator of the 
broader entrepreneurial climate in the Exchange and the economy. 
Please see Appendix B for Table 2 
As compared to 54 new listings in this sub-period, only 5 IPOs were 
conducted contemporaneously to listing. Three of these were conducted 
by new banks and occurred before 1910. The remaining two took place 
during the boom years 1917-8 and were conducted by private industrial 
firms. This was the harbinger of the rise of industrial IPOs that would 
bloom in the ensuing decade. On the whole for this sub-period the 
relative role of IPOs in market development was limited. 
3.4 New development, the ‘roaring twenties’, world crisis: 1923-1940 
The ‘population shock’ of 1922 was experienced as a disaster by those 
who were uprooted but became a sort of growth engine for the Greek 
economy. Asia Minor Greeks were skilled and enterprising, and they 
soon sought new ventures in their new home. Furthermore, public 
spending (including foreign aid) on refugee assistance created large 
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domestic demands for food, clothing and housing. The pace of growth 
picked up; 1923-29 was a distinct episode of rapid development in 
recent Greek history. Inflation also continued but was on the whole 
much lower than the earlier decade, averaging an annual rate of 13 
percent in the years 1924-27 . In 1928 Greece, under pressure from 
international donors, undertook monetary stabilization, pegged the 
drachma to the British pound sterling (which adhered to the Gold 
Exchange Standard) and created a central bank, the Bank of Greece, to 
oversee and execute monetary policy . Once again Greece became a full 
participant in the international monetary system, except that the system 
itself proved short-lived.  
The 1929 crash in the New York market ushered in a period of general 
financial crisis and depression. On September 21, 1931 the pound 
sterling went off the gold standard and the Greek government closed 
down the Exchange and all trading in foreign exchange. In April 1932, 
Greece itself abandoned the gold exchange standard and declared 
official default on its public debt. The Exchange did not reopen until 
December of that year. Following most advanced countries Greece 
instituted protectionist measures. The crisis was not as harsh in Greece 
as in most advanced industrial economies. Under the protectionist 
regime, the economy picked up and local manufacturing was once again 
energized, Costis (2013). This moderate but upward economic trend 
would be finally interrupted with the eruption of the Second World War 
in 1939.  
In the 1920s, especially after 1924, the Exchange experienced another 
boom and an unprecedented record in new listings. 71 companies were 
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admitted to trading in this period, of which most prominent were 
banking firms with 15 listings, textiles with 12, construction with 8, 
chemicals and food each with 7 new listings. This listing activity 
represented about 50 percent of all listings since the Exchange’s 
inception and would not be encountered again until postwar booms in 
the 1970s and the 1990s. In the ensuing decade of the 1930s, new 
listings would continue but at a reduced pace, with 33 new admissions 
to trading, with textile firms covering about one third of that number. A 
very interesting feature of the 1930s was that the financial stabilization 
of the late twenties and the financial crisis of the thirties led to the 
failure or merger of many of the new banks that had emerged during the 
boom of the 1920s. Please see Appendix 2 for Table 3. 
As compared to the record 104 new listings in this sub-period, 11 IPOs 
were conducted. All of those took place until 1930 and a long stoppage 
in IPO activity ensued that covered the whole decade of the 1930s. Nine 
IPOs represented offers of industrial stocks, one was conducted by a 
construction company and one by the newly established central bank. 
This is clearly the period of the rise of industrial finance through the 
stock exchange.  Aside from this significant sectoral shift however, the 
number of IPOs as a proportion of total listings actually declined as 
compared to earlier periods. The need for visibility and reputation 
during the ‘hot market’ of the 1920s was probably running ahead of 




4. Listings and IPOs: Frequency, Size and Quasi-IPOs 
In this section we present in more rigorous fashion the features of 
listings and IPOs as they evolved over the long 60-year period under 
study. We address several related research questions. A first one relates 
to size and age of the firms admitted to listing. Whether larger or 
smaller, older or younger companies sought access to the exchange is 
important in itself, as it indicates whether the exchange was, or became 
over time, a trading venue for small and/or young firms. Within a 
broader perspective this is very relevant to the contribution of the 
Exchange to enterprise development and economic change.  
The second question relates to whether simple listings were actually 
‘IPOs in waiting’, i.e. listings that were quickly followed by a capital 
increase. We collect data on all cases where a listing was followed, 
within a period of two years, by an issue of new shares. We consider 
these as “quasi IPOs” and compare them to actual IPOs and their 
features. The inclusion of ‘quasi-IPOs’ offers a more accurate assessment 
of the role of the Exchange in the financing of listed firms, considering 
that pure IPOs may have been avoided due to historical reasons, the 
persistent lack of IPO regulation, or  the implied low quality of 
disclosure. 
4.1 The size and age of listed companies 
Given the length of time and the multi-faceted economic conditions 
during the long sixty years that we described, the examination of these 
simple features acquires significance since it allows an evolutionary 
perspective. We saw that in the early decades there was emphasis on 
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infra-structural projects which were necessarily large. Manufacturing 
came later and its growth was largely spurred by expanding domestic 
market potential. This would imply that the size of listed undertakings 
would change over time as the type and scale of undertakings by firms 
also changed.   
In the case of simple listings, size is measured by the nominal value of 
the stock at the time of listing. In the case of IPOs we measure the 
magnitude of the actual offer, which is defined as the number of shares 
offered times the offer price, and indicates the amount of capital raised 
by the IPO. Age is uniformly measured as the number of years between 
the founding of a company and the time of listing. 
 Table 4 shows the means of size and age for both simple listings and 
IPOs. In panel A, the estimates are shown for the whole period. In panels 
B-D the estimates are shown for each sub-period discussed in the 
previous section. In panels E-F the sample is decomposed into ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ listing periods. Please see Appendix B for Table 4 
We first note that the average size of IPO offerings exceeds by far the 
average size of firms that obtain simple listing. This is easy to interpret: 
IPOs were necessarily used when capital needs were high and could not 
be satisfied by recourse to narrow networks of capital providers or 
private resources of original owners. Thus, within the IPO sample there 
are a few very large placements. Yet, as already noted, listings by far 
exceeded IPOs in number, the latter being a small minority. Looking at 
the sub-periods, we note that whereas in the early period 1880-98, IPOs 
represented 33 percent of all new listings, in the subsequent periods the 
share of IPOs fell to only 10 percent of all listings. We conclude that the 
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growth of the primary market was stunted and did not keep pace with 
the general and considerable expansion of the   market as a whole.  
It is telling that total capital raised in IPOs throughout this period 
amounted to about 3.5 million gold sovereigns.  The aggregate 
capitalization of (non-IPO) listed firms estimated at the time of their first 
trading amounted to about 24 million. The comparison gives a fair idea 
of relative magnitudes and the limited role of IPOs. It also suggests that 
private offerings that occurred before listing were a primary form of 
capital gathering off the Exchange.  
The estimates in Panels B-D show a clear tendency of reduction in size 
over time, both for simple listing and IPOs. This is consistent with the 
conjecture that new sectors and smaller undertakings were gaining 
access to the Exchange over time.  At the same time the average and 
especially the median age of listed firms were relatively low (3-5 years) 
and did not show considerable change over time. Thus, we conclude that 
the Exchange was a venue for trading shares of relatively young firms, 
which makes sense in a small and relatively young country which was 
still in an early stage of development.  
In panels E-F we decompose the sample in two segments according to 
our prior definition of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ periods as shown in Figure 2. We 
recall that we characterized as ‘hot listing periods’ those in which the 
number of listings, for at least two consecutive years, surpassed the 
average for the overall sample. In these panels we show the breakdown 
for simple listings and for IPOs.  
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The estimations in panels E and F reveal that the size of listings during 
the ‘hot’ period was much lower than in the ‘cold’ period: an average of 
66.4 thousand gold sovereigns in the ‘hot period’ versus 110.6 thousand 
in the ‘cold period’. This implies that the ‘hot’ periods were times during 
which a rush for listing took place energizing the supply of shares by 
smaller firms. This is not an unexpected result.  
The comparison is more telling in the case of IPOs. The difference in size 
between the two types of market condition is far more dramatic: the 
average offer was 25.8 thousand gold sovereigns in the ‘hot period’ as 
compared to 352.9 thousand in the ‘cold period’. The total number of 
IPOs, contrary to simple listings, was about evenly divided between the 
two types of periods, so that total capital raised during the ‘cold period’ 
(3.2 million) was about 7 times the amount of capital raised in the ‘hot 
period’ (459 thousand). This is a clear indication of a break in the pattern 
of the firms undertaking an IPO in the two periods. An element of 
market timing might have been present with firms preferring to engage 
in IPOs only during times when the supply of shares for new listing was 
restricted, as opposed to ‘hot’ listing periods when both investor and 
entrepreneur sentiment was presumably higher and many 
entrepreneurs preferred simple listing. 
4.2 IPOs and Quasi-IPOs 
We characterize as a ‘quasi-IPO’ the case where a firm announces a 
capital increase soon after listing, offering sale of new shares for cash. If 
the time of the capital increase is indeed close to that of listing, the 
strategy comes close to this being a delayed IPO, rather than a truly 
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‘seasoned’ offering. We must recall that in the Greek context 
underwriting was not a developed institutional arrangement with all the 
regulatory requirements of the present day. The primary sale of shares 
was unregulated and issuers were the main decision-makers. Disclosure 
quality at the time of listing was probably low. The function of 
certification, which in the modern literature is attributed to 
underwriters, was vested in the seal of approval offered by the listing 
authority itself. Thus a quasi-IPO would benefit from both the 
certification of the listing decision and the acquisition of visibility 
through trading. Unfortunately, there is little or no evidence of trading 
activity, so it is not possible to distinguish firms which acquired a trading 
track record quickly after being listed. Instead, we have imposed a 
reasonable time limit of two years as a period during which some trading 
record is acquired but also in which the listing certification retains 
validity as a reputational asset. Listed firms which engaged in capital 
increases within two years of listing are here considered as quasi-IPOs.  
In Table 5 we show a list of quasi-IPOs that took place over the entire 
period.  Please see Appendix B for Table 5. 
In Table 6 we show descriptive statistics for quasi-IPOs and IPOs for the 
whole period and by ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ listing period. Size now describes 
the size of the offer in all cases. Data are classified by the date of listing, 
not by the date of the ensuing capital increase in the case of quasi-IPOs. 
Please see Appendix B for Table 6. 
As shown in Table 6, 41‘quasi-IPOs’ were performed over the period, 
almost double the number of IPOs. However, total capital raised through 
these ‘quasi-IPOs’ amounted to about 1.5 million gold sovereigns, less 
  
36 
than half the aggregate amount raised by IPOs (3.7 million gold 
sovereigns). Thus, it appears that ‘quasi-IPOs’ were chosen by smaller 
firms and for smaller under-takings; these cases were probably more 
needful of the certification and the visibility provided by an Exchange 
listing, before attempting to raise funds.  
As expected, when we look at the decomposition of the sample between 
‘hot’ and ‘cold’ listing periods, quasi- IPOs far exceed IPOs both in 
number and in capital raised during the ‘hot listing’ periods. The reverse 
holds in the ‘cold’ period.  
The basic conclusion is that especially smaller firms used Exchange listing 
as a precondition for raising funds after having gained access to market 
trading. This implies that the supply of securities in actual IPOs 
understated the true demand for capital by new firms and that this 
demand became manifest shortly after listing, for smaller firms.  These 
used listing itself as a ‘certification’ signal that facilitated the supply of 
new capital in an environment in which mandatory and uniform 
disclosure requirements were not enforced. 
5. The Double Face of IPO Pricing: Overpricing or Underpricing? 
5.1 The Overall Picture of Public Offerings 
The modern literature is replete with evidence on IPO under-pricing. This 
appears to be a phenomenon of recent times however. Several historical 
studies of large markets in the 19th or early 20th centuries show that IPO 
under-pricing was either absent or very small in magnitude (Chambers 
and Dimson (2003), Dimson (2007), Fohlin (2000), Biais (2002), Jovanovic 
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and Rousseau (2005), Chambers (2005), Schlag and Wodrich (2005), 
Champers and Dimson (2009), Champers (2009), Marsh (2010), Marsh 
(2011), Burhop (2011), Chambers (2011 ), Burhop et al. (2011))13.  
We use our database to pose the question of pricing to Greek historical 
data for 1880-1940. We measure initial returns (RIR) by observing the 
difference of the first trading price and the offer price of the new shares, 













where, CPi,1 is the price on the first trading day of the newly listed shares 
and OPi,0 is the offering price. 
In Table 7 we show all the IPOs conducted over the period and the 
calculation of associated initial returns. Please see Appendix B for Table 
7. The Table’s basic finding is stark and impressive: a visible and large 
shift in the pricing of IPOs took place during the period of our study. 
Specifically, panel A presents the initial returns for each IPO that took 
place in the Athens Stock Exchange over the period 1880-1940, while in 
Panel B we estimate that the average of initial returns of Greek IPOs was 
114.91%. i.e. offer prices understated prices at first trading by this 
percentage. This high average masks however a very large swing across 
time periods.  
During the period from 1880 to 1898, public offers were overpriced by 
an average of 29.75%, with all five IPOs undertaken being over-priced. 
Overpricing persisted at an average level of 12.20% in the period from 
                                                 
13
 See especially Elroy-Dimson, Burhop [2011], Chambers [2011] 
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1899 to 1922. This meant that the average buyer of shares at these 
primary offerings would experience a loss had they sold at first trading 
prices as compared to the offer price they paid. This picture accords with 
evidence in other European markets for the equivalent period.  
However, the finding is radically reversed in the 1920s. More specifically 
in the period after 1922, IPOs experienced severe underpricing, (i.e. 
severe understatement of trading price by the offer price) with a mean 
value of 238.44%. Especially during 1925 – a boom year in the ‘roaring 
twenties’ – a record annual number of seven IPOs were performed; their 
under-pricing averaged 330 percent. Even the shares of the Bank of 
Greece, Greece’s new Central Bank which were issued in 1927, were 
underpriced by 52%.  
5.2 A Simple Statistical Model of Underpricing 
We formulate a statistical model of underpricing in order to study the 
role of various factors that may have contributed to the phenomenon. 
We undertake regression analysis despite the small size of our IPO 
sample to explore if any significant additional indications can be gained. 
The regression model is specified as follows: 
RIR = a0 + β1 LnSIZE + β2 Ln(1+AGE) + β3 GO + β4 Y + β5 D1925 +εi                 (2) 
The dependent variable is as defined in (1). The independent variables 
are defined as follows: 
LnSIZE measures (the logarithm of) the size of the offer, i.e. the number 
of issued shares times the offer price. Offer prices are expressed in gold 
sovereigns throughout. This variable is available in our collected data. 
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Extensive prior literature from contemporary markets indicates that 
large companies are associated with a lower level of underpricing 
(Maksimovic and Ural (1993); Brennan and Franks (1997); Heeley, 
Matusik and Jain (2007)). We therefore expect a negative relationship 
between the size of the offering across time and returns.  
Ln (1+AGE) measures (the logarithm of) the age of the company at the 
time of the public offering. This is the difference in years between the 
date of company establishment and the date of the public offering. This 
variable is also available in our collected data. Empirical literature 
indicatew that higher age contributes to lower underpricing (i.e 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989); Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Thus, 
we hypothesize a negative relationship between the age of the offering 
and returns. 
GO measures the percentage of equity ownership offered to the public 
at the time of the public offering. This variable is also available in our 
collected data. Chambers and Dimson (2009) in their historical study on 
LSE indicate that underpricing systematically decreases as the 
proportion of shares sold increases; Contemporary studies and evidence 
(Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Sherman and Titman (2002)), highlight a 
trade-off between the proportion of post-issue voting equity sold in the 
offering and the extent to which shares are underpriced. Thus we 
hypothesize a positive relationship between given ownership and 
underpricing. This effect may in fact be stronger in the Greek historical 
context of low disclosure. It is likely that a higher percentage of given 
ownership may require the attraction of a broader pool of initial 
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investors who are less informed, and therefore be positively associated 
with stronger under-pricing.  
Y is the number of non-IPO listings during the year of the IPO, measured 
as a percentage of total listings. This variable serves to indicate the 
pressure of supply of listings and capture the impact of ‘hot’ listing 
periods.  
D1925 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 only for year 1925 when 
the number of IPOs reached an all-time high (7 IPOs within that year). By 
this variable we seek to single out effects of extreme supply pressure 
which was specifically observed in that particular year.  
In Table 8 we show the results of estimation of the regression model (2). 
Please see Appendix B for Table 8. 
We estimate regression (2) in three ways: first, we include both variables 
Y and D1925 (column 1) and then we use them as alternatives (columns 
(2) and (3)).  
Looking first at the results with firm-level variables we note in Table 8 
that the effect of size is strongly negative and significant, whereas the 
measure of age is not. The latter result is probably due to the fact that 
intra-sample variation of the age variable is small. The percent of given 
ownership is strongly and positively associated with under-pricing. These 
findings are consistent with international evidence from more developed 
markets but also reflect characteristically the low disclosure regime of 
the Greek market. In our view, variables such as size and given 
ownership served as signals to investors who, at the time, could not 
easily assess a company’s prospects because of uneven disclosure 
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requirements. Hence, the effects of size and given ownership are so 
clearly discernible even in a small sample.  
Coming now to market-level variables, the supply of non-IPO listings (Y) 
appears to exercise a positive and significant effect on underpricing. This 
implies that during ‘hot’ listing periods IPOs were more severely 
underpriced, as theory and empirical evidence from other markets also 
indicate.  
When the dummy variable for year 1925 is used, it appears to be also a 
significant, strong and positive influence on underpricing. In fact, when it 
is used jointly with the supply variable Y, the latter loses all significance. 
Thus, during 1925 we note not only the largest number of IPOs in any 
single year for our sample, but also the highest level of underpricing. 
Whereas, the intensity of underpricing can be explained by supply 
pressure, it is also necessary to ask what was so special about 1925, so 
as to have such a high supply of IPOs.  
In our sample, we note that 1925 was the first year of IPO activity after a 
long pause. It was also a year in which stock prices peaked. The last IPO 
had taken place 7 years before, in a year (1918) when the Stock market 
had also boomed. Several historical sources indicate that the post 1922 
period was one of inflation which led to decreases in both the real wage 
and the real interest rate, thus enabling higher profitability 
(Christodoulaki (2001). Increasing profitability was one of the causes of 
the IPO boom of 1925. Furthermore, 1926 marked a sharp turn towards 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. As Christodoulaki (2001) notes 
“The timing of this change in economic performance is located in late 
1925 and early 1926 when pressure to improve the fiscal performance of 
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the government and to follow contractionary monetary policies in order 
to stabilize the drachma was increased”14. The peak in IPO activity 
observed in 1925 was therefore attributable to a confluence of factors: 
long pent up demand, high stock market valuations and expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
6. Conclusion 
The development of the Athens Stock Exchange from its inception (1880) 
to the outbreak of the Second World War (1940) was an active process. 
It came to include 166 new listings of private companies, besides the 
mandatory listing of government bonds. The Stock market experienced 
several ‘hot’ periods of listing activity and peaking prices. In the first 
three decades of its operation as a trading venue, the Exchange 
competed with a free market which operated informally alongside the 
official function.  
However, the Exchange’s role as a primary market for capital-rising 
through IPOs was limited. Only 13 percent of the firms that attained 
listing over this long period actually performed IPOs. Another 25 percent 
however chose to increase their capital by public offers shortly after 
acquiring the status of listed firms. In part, the explanation of low IPO 
activity, especially in the early period of Stock Exchange operations, 
must be sought in the traumatic effects of a bubble in the 1870s, before 
a formal Exchange had been organized. In later times, when the effects 
of the early bubble had been forgotten, IPO activity would still remain 
sparse. This could be the result of insufficient liquidity in an emerging 
                                                 
14
  Christodoulaki, O. “Industrial growth in Greece between the wars: A new perspective” European 
Review of Economic History, 5, p. 80 
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economy but could also be related to the lack of regulation, especially 
adequate provisions for disclosure and IPO quality that could inspire 
trust to investors. 
Our analysis shows that the parallel activity of quasi-IPOs (capital raising 
performed within two years of listing) was much more fervent, especially 
in the 1920s, and during ‘hot’ periods, generally. The difference between 
IPOs and quasi-IPOs was that the latter had already obtained the 
certification of the listing authority and had established a track record of 
trading. Hence, whereas the same amount of capital raised in an IPO or a 
quasi-IPO made the same demands on liquidity, they offered differential 
levels of information about the issuer and met with different levels of 
investor trust.   
It is notable that despite several public interventions in the early 
twentieth century on the governance structure of the Exchange, IPOs 
remained unregulated, investment banking services were not 
standardized and the quality of disclosure was low and uneven. This is 
probably the longer-term explanation of the relative weakness of the 
primary market. It must be clarified that there was no general absence 
of regulatory activity. Significant regulatory changes did take place from 
1918 to 1928, but they were focused on listing requirements, secondary 
trading and the duties of brokers, but not on IPOs and investment 
banking.  
Examining the sample of 21 IPOs that did take place over the period 
1880-1940, we note a significant change in character and composition. 
Whereas banking IPOs appeared throughout the period, non-financial 
issues shifted from infrastructure-related projects and few heavy 
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industry undertakings to light industry ventures mainly oriented to the 
satisfaction of domestic demand. A notable reduction in the average size 
over time and a visible shift from over- to under-pricing around the 
second decade of the twentieth century are evident trends. Analysis of 
pricing revealed that size, the percent of given ownership and the 
pressure of supply of securities were associated with under-pricing.  
In a more general historical assessment it appears that the Athens Stock 
Exchange responded to two major aspects of economic developments in 
Greece. The first was the large expansion of the domestic market that 
resulted from substantial changes both in the country’s area and 
population. This eventually shifted the focus of listing activity to firms 
catering to the domestic market. This was also a response to protracted 
war conditions which created a de facto protectionism of the enlarged 
domestic market. The second aspect was the emergence of inflation and 
monetary instabilities, especially in the period after the decade of wars 
(1912-1922). Our evidence shows a large increase in listing activity and 
IPOs in the 1920s when inflationary profits were making an appearance. 
These phenomena would come to an abrupt stop with restrictive policies 
enacted from 1926.  
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Appendix  A:  Listings,  IPOs,  Annual Volume,  Mean First Day 
Prices and Returns,  First Trading Day IPO Returns,  Proceeds 
and Money Left on the Table, 1880-1940 
 
The study starts from 1880 when Athens Stock Exchange officially started 
its operations. Both IPOs and listings are included in the table. Listing 
price is the nominal stock price of listings or the offer price of IPOs’ new 
stocks offered during the public offering procedure. First trading price is 
the first closing price of IPOs or listing in the A.S.E. on the first trading 
day. First day returns for IPOs are the change from the offer (or listing) 
price to the closing price on the first day of trading and are equally 
weighted (EW). First day returns for listings are the change from the 
nominal price to the first closing price on the first or following day of 
trading and are equally weighted (EW). Raised Funds and money left on 
the table are in Gold Sovereign prices. The amount of money left on the 
table by IPOs is defined as the difference between the closing price on 
the first day and the listing price, multiplied by the number of shares sold 
to the public (new investors). In other words, this is the first-day profit 
received by investors who were allocated IPO shares at the offer price. It 
represents a wealth transfer from the shareholders of the issuing firm to 









Panel A: No of Listings, No of IPOs & Mean Prices (Trading, Listing, Offer)  

















1884 3 2 3.91 3.07 1 3.82 3.06 
1887 4 1 3.00 2.97 3 8.66 4.76 
1889 1 1 6.52 9.13 0 - - 
1891 1 1 6.23 6.69 0 - - 
1892 2 2 5.74 5.51 0 - - 
1893 1 1 14.64 12.24 0 - - 
1894 1 1 2.26 3.05 0 - - 
1897 1 1 5.89 2.47 0 - - 
1898 1 0 - - 1 3.48 2.28 
1899 3 3 6.01 4.51 0 - - 
1900 1 0 - - 1 4.88 4.90 
1903 3 3 5.67 5.04 0 - - 
1905 2 2 6.90 7.35 0 - - 
1906 1 0 - - 1 5.58 5.65 
1907 1 1 3.69 3.98 0 - - 
1908 2 2 3.68 3.25 0 - - 
1909 4 3 1.95 2.20 1 3.82 3.82 
1910 1 1 16.12 17.74 0 - - 
1911 3 3 4.03 4.83 0 - - 
1912 4 4 3.97 4.35 0 - - 
1913 2 2 3.97 4.37 0 - - 
1914 1 1 3.97 4.13 0 - - 
1916 3 3 4.04 5.11 0 - - 
1917 5 4 4.06 5.72 1 4.07 5.29 
1918 4 3 4.00 6.23 1 5.27 5.68 
1919 3 3 4.06 4.96 0 - - 
1920 4 4 4.38 5.40 0 - - 
1921 2 2 2.94 5.30 0 - - 
1922 4 4 0.52 1.09 0 - - 
1923 4 4 0.31 0.69 0 - - 
1924 8 8 0.44 1.10 0 - - 
1925 17 10 0.54 1.49 7 0.30 1.31 
1926 10 8 0.68 1.72 2 0.51 0.67 
1927 8 7 0.40 0.63 1 0.26 0.69 
1928 5 5 0.53 1.06 0 - - 
1929 9 9 1.28 2.59 0 - - 
1930 2 1 0.26 0.29 1 13.33 20.26 
1931 2 2 0.8 1.23 0 - - 
                                                 
15 No listing or IPO launched on the ASE in years not included in the table 
16
 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the 
first date of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
17
 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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1934 2 2 0.11 0.38 0 - - 
1935 6 6 0.40 0.62 0 - - 
1936 2 2 0.34 0.47 0 - - 
1937 5 5 0.39 1.06 0 - - 
1938 6 6 0.44 1.58 0 - - 
1939 8 8 0.70 1.81 0 - - 
1940 3 3 0.88 1.11 0 - - 
Total 165 144   21   
Panel B: First Day IPO Returns, Raising Funds and Money Left on the Table for IPOs, 1880 to 1940 
Period18 Number of 
IPOs19,20 
Mean Rate of 1st 
Day Returns (%) 
Raised Funds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Money left on the Table 
(in Gold Sov.) 
1884 1 -0.20 61.255 306.28 
1887 3 -0.38 625.104 0 
1898 1 -0.34 111.451 0 
1900 1  0.49 195.333 0 
1906 1  0.01 223.357 2.919 
1909 1 0.00 133.740 0 
1917 1 0.30 56.980 17.094 
1918 1 0.77 158.279 12.175 
1925 7 331.42 123.455 439.602 
1926 2 0.45 83.715 31.790 
1927 1 1.60 39.966 63.947 
1930 1 0.52 1.066.666 554.666 
 
 
                                                 
18
  No IPO took place in years not included in the table  
19
 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the 
first date of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
20
 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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For 1880-1912 see Μ. Riginos, The movement of foreign exchange and monetary values in 
Greek Markets (in Greek) Athens 1997  
For 1913-1940: The Stock Exchange Yearbook 1974, Athens 1974
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Appendix B:  Tables 
 
Table 1: Listings and IPOs by Sector during the sub-period 1880-1898 
Year Number of 
Listings & 
IPOs 
Banks Railways Construction 
        Firms             
Chemicals    Textiles    
Beverages 
    Other 
 
1884 3  1  1                     1   1 
1887 4 1 2 1     
1889 1   1     
1891 1                   1   1 
1892 2  1         1 
1893 1           1 
1894 1 1       
1897 1           1 
1898 1           1 
Total 15 2 4 2 1       6 
 
Table 2: Listings and IPOs by Sector during the sub-period 1899-1922 
Year Number of 
Listings & 
IPOs 
Banks Railways Construction 
        Firms             
Chemicals    Textiles    Beverages         Other 
 
1899 3     1  2 
1900 1 1       
1903 3 1 1 1     
1905 2       2 
1906 1 1       
1907 1       1 
1908 2  1     1 
1909 4 1     2 1 
1910 1  1      
1911 3    1   2 
1912 4 1      3 
1913 2    1  1  
1914 1       1 
1916 3    1   2 
1917 5      1 4 
1918 4 1    1 1 1 
1919 3     1 1         1 
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1920 4 2     1         1 
1921 2 1      1 
1922 4 1    1          2 
Total 53 10 3 1 3 4 7        25 
 
Table 3: Listings and IPOs by Sector during the sub-period 1923-1940 
Year Number of 
Listings & 
IPOs 
Banks Railways Construction 
        Firms             
Chemicals   Textiles    Beverages         Other 
 
1923 4 1  1 1  1  
1924 8 3    3 1 1 
1925 17 2  2 4  2 7 
1926 10 2   2 1 1 4 
1927 8     2  3 
1928 5 1 1 3  1   
1929 9 2  2  4 1 2 
1930 2 1      1 
1931 2    1   1 
1934 2      1 1 
1935 6     2 1 3 
1936 2   1    1 
1937 5     4  1 
1938 6     3 1 2 
1939 8    3 1  4 
1940 3 1      2 
Total 97 13 1 9 11 21 9        33 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Listings and IPOs 
Simple Listings                                                                      IPOs 
                                                      Panel A: Whole Period, 1880-1940 












Mean 6.72 82,916 6 166,061 38 
Median 3.5 34,578 3 16,634 33 
Sample 144 144 21 21 21 
Panel B: Sub-Period, 1880-1898 












Mean 3.8 70,214 5.6 509,206 63 
Median 3 56,678 5 103,734 50 
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Sample 10 10 5 5 5 
Panel C: Sub-Period, 1899-1922 












Mean 6.79 169,374 2.2 67,942 24 
Median 2.5 80,988 2 40,273 25 
Sample 48 48 5 5 5 
Panel D: Sub-Period, 1923-1940 












Mean 7.03 36,676 7.27 54,684 33 
Median 4 19,094 3 6,574 29 
Sample 86 86 11 11 11 
Panel E: Division by ‘Hot’ and ‘Cold’ Listings 
                     ‘Hot’ Period 












Mean 7.48 110,681 6.8 25,888 30 
Median 3 59,665 2.5 6,618 23 
Sample 54 54 12 12 12 
                   ‘Cold’ Period 












Mean 6.27           66,441 4.1 352,957 48 
Median 4 24,229 5 48,833 38 
Sample 90 90 9 9 9 
Panel F: t-stat for difference on mean 
 0.465 1.785 0.880 -1.717 -0.909 
 (0.725) (0.090)* (0.408) (0.094)* (0.390) 
Table 5: List of Quasi IPOs 
Panel A: All Quasi IPOs case by case 
Quasi IPO Year Offer Price Trading Price Raising Funds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Public and Municipal Workings 1880 3.01 2.98 34482 
Hellenic Metal Company 1887 3.21 3.30 112179 
Company of Wine and Alcohol 1905 3.96 4.26 226415 
Company of Chemicals 1909 3.97 4.64 79365 
Gr National Stream Navigation 1911 4.17 5.67 79365 
Titan 1911 3.97 4.85 79365 
Aliveri Mining 1912 4.04 4.81 121163 
Agyra General Commerce 1917 4.10 4.42 81900 
Piraeus Bank 1917 3.90 6.09 117050 
Hellenic Mining Company 1918 4.06 5.72 66152 
Piraeus Business Company 1918 4.06 6.90 81168 
Industrial Company 1918 2.96 4.43 103427 
General Bank of Greece 1920 4.88 8.79 88652.48 
Hellenic Tobacco Company 1921 1.02 1.83 71058 
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Central Bank of Greece 1921 0.78 1.44 27273 
Oropos Mining 1922 0.30 0.65 9047 
Hellenic Olive Oil 1922 0.70 1.09 28085 
Kosmadopoulos Bank 1922 0.34 0.85 10208 
Tekton Construction 1923 0.34 0.61 17013 
Avezap 1923 0.34 0.88 6805 
Agricultural Industry 1923 0.45 0.91 1360 
Bank of Thessaly 1924 0.46 1.23 190114 
Bank of Hellenic Securities 1924 0.40 0.70 30173 
Maritime Bank 1924 0.60 0.68 34398 
Vermion 1924 0.40 2.04 11988 
Hellenic Silk 1924 0.39 1.55 50303 
Naoussa Fabrics 1924 0.39 0.87 38695 
Atlas Construction 1924 0.32 3.24 38834 
Hlios Sugar Company 1925 0.33 0.48 16435 
Ergon Technical Construction 1925 0.33 0.66 16435 
Pharmaceutical Union 1925 0.30 0.82 15105 
Piraeus Refridgerators 1925 0.28 0.72 5849 
Anatoli 1926 0.26 0.58 13157 
Olympos Concrete 1926 0.66 1.07 65866 
Akte Technical Company 1927 0.27 0.50 27322 
Ertha Sea Construction 1927 0.83 1.20 25874 
Electric Lamp 1928 0.57 0.69 8600 
Trikala Fabrics 1935 0.11 0.14 9174 
Naoussa Lanara Oil 1935 0.11 1.98 10989 
Etma Silk 1937 0.60 0.91 93475 
Iris Chocolate 1938 0 - 6578 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for Quasi IPOs and IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for Quasi IPOs vis a vis IPOs are included in this Table. Quasi IPOs or 
‘Delayed’ IPOs are characterized those cases of listings where firms obtain listing for 
trading and soon afterwards  (in time close to that of listing day) announce a capital 
increase, offering sale of new shares for cash.  AGE, Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total of 
one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date, Size counts the number of 
new issued shares offered to the public during the IPO or the Right Offering procedure 
multiplied with their offer price. 
 
Panel A: Comparison Quasi IPOs with IPOs (The Whole Period) 












Mean 6.90 38,472 38.34 6 166,061 38 
Median 3 20,325 34.74 3 16,634 33 
Min 0 517 0.63 1 1,697 6 
Max 64 208,501 87.42 46 1,564,661 100 
       
Sample 41 41 41 21 21 21 
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Panel B: Sub-Period, 1880-1898 









            Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
   GO 
Mean 5 49,158 83.10 5.6 509,206    62.5 
Median - -  5 103,734    50 
Min - -  2 22,667    100 
Max - -  11 1,564,661    25 
       
Sample 2 2 2 5 5    5 
Panel C: Sub-Period, 1899-1922 












Mean 5.64 59,592 59.51 2.2 67,942 23.8 
Median 3 44,271 62.07 2 40,273 25 
Min 0 6,746 18.36 1 8,140 33 
Max 48 208,501 87.42 5 223,357 14 
       
Sample 16 16 16 5 5 5 
Panel D: Sub-Period, 1923-1940 












Mean 5.46 23,947 23.26 7.27 54,684 33 
Median 4 15,086 21.60 3 6,574 29 
Min 2 517,45 0.64 2 1,697 6 
Max 14 95,963 48.12 46 533,333 63 
       
Sample 24 24 24 11 11 11 
 
Panel E: Comparison of Quasi IPOs with IPOs (Hot Listing Periods) 












Mean 5.76 33,381 34.86 7.27 25,888 30 
Median 3 17,210 33.33 3 6,618 23 
Min 0 517 1.02 2 1,697 6 
Max 48 208,501 85.39 46 223,358 63 
       
Sample 30 30 30 12 12 12 
Panel F: Comparison Quasi IPOs with IPOs (Cold Listing Periods) 












Mean 4.81 52,357 43.07 4.11 352,957 48 
Median 3 44,515 40.29 5 48,833 38 
Min 2 3,158 0.64 1 8,140 14 
Max 10 131,181 87.42 11 1,564,661 100 
       
Sample 11 11 11 9 9 5 
Panel G: Panel F: t-stat for difference on mean 
 Quasi IPOs IPOs 
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 0.350 0.364 0.519 0.880 -1.717 0.909 
 (0.734) (0.724) (0.611) (0.408) (0.094)* (0.390) 
 
Table 7: List of IPOs 
 
Panel A: All IPOs case by case 




(in Gold Sov.) 
Money left on the 
Table 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Powder Co. 1884 3.78 3.02 -20 22,667 0 
Hpiro-Thessaly Bank 1887 10.37 9.00 -13.33 103,734 0 
Thessaly Railways 1887 9.00 5.01 -44.23 827,109 0 
S. P.A.P. Railways 1887 8.64 5.46 -36.8 1,564,661 0 
Public Mortgage Mgt. Co. 1898 3.48 2.28 -34.4 27,862 0 
Bank of Crete 1900 4.88 4.21 -13.79 48,833 0 
Bank of Anatolia 1906 5.58 5.66 1.30 223,357 2.919 
Commercial Bank 1909 3.82 3.82 0 19,105 0 
Ermis Industrial 1917 4.07 5.29 30 8,140 2,442 
Isaias – Megaris 1918 5.24 5.64 7.69 40,273 3,097 
United Distilleres Corp. 1925 0.33 1.31 300 6,574 19,722 
Kekrops Construction 1925 0.33 2.01 510 2,794 14,249 
Athena Car Company 1925 0.32 1.75 450 9,547 42,963 
Sanitas 1925 0.30 0.91 200 2,113 4,227 
Georgiadis – Sekeris 1925 0.28 0.95 240 4,212 10,110 
Commericial Credit Bank 1925 0.28 1.25 350 16,634 58,220 
Kyklops Pottery 1925 0.28 1.03 270 2,356 6,362 
Hellenic Carpet Factory 1926 0.78 0.94 20.91 15,605 3,263 
Chemical Industries 1926 0.24 0.41 70 1,697 1,188 
Diamantopoulos Constr. 1927 0.27 0.69 160 6,661 10,657 
Bank of Greece 1930 13.33 20.27 52 533,333 277,333 
Panel B: Initial Returns (IR) of IPOs 
Period 
 
Whole (1880-1940) 1880-1898 1899-1922 1923-1940 
Mean 114.91 -29.75 -12.20 238.44 
Median 30 -34.4 1.30 240 
Min -44.23 -44.23 -100 20.91 
Max 510 -20 7.69 510 
     









Table 8: Results of multiple regressions for IPOs of period 1880-1940 
 
This table reports the results of multiple regressions using a sample of 21 IPOs listed in 
Athens Stock Exchange in the period 1880-1940. IR is IPOs initial returns in the end of 
first days of trading defined as IR= (EPi,t- OPi,0)/OPi AGE, Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total 
of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date, Size is the number of 
new issued shares offered to the public during the IPO, multiplied with their  offer price 
(measured by the natural logarithm), GO identifies the rate of stocks offered by listing  
firms to new shareholders during the public offering procedure. Y identifies the number 
of listings that were launched on ASE without public offering procedure. Dum 1925 is a 
dummy variable that counts all IPOs listed in ASE on 1925. We insert the value ‘1’ for 
IPOs listed in 1925 and ‘0’ for the rest IPOs.   
 
***Significance at the one per cent level.  
 **Significance at the five per cent level *Significance at the ten per cent level. 
 
Variables IR IR IR  
Constant 427.7** 422.7*** 349.3  
 (0.0230) (0.006) (0.125)  
AGE 1.680 1.662 1.785  
 (0.140) (0.110) (0.120)  
SIZE -46.45** -46.06*** -44.28*  
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.054)  
GO 1.887** 1.878** 2.091**  
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.029)  
Y -1.061 - 46.10**  
 (0.960) - (0.031)  
Dum1925 187.0** 184.4*** -  
 (0.025) (0.007) -  
     
Obs. 21 21 21  
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